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Abstract 
The development of executive function (EF) in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has been 
investigated using only “cool”-cognitive- EF tasks while there is limited knowledge regarding 
the development of “hot”-affective- EF. Although cool EF development and its links to theory 
of mind (ToM) have been widely examined, understanding of the influence of hot EF to ToM 
mechanisms is minimal. The present study introduced a longitudinal design to examine the 
developmental changes in cool and hot EF of children with ASD (n=45) and matched (to age 
and IQ) controls (n=37) as well as the impact of EF on ToM development over a school year. 
For children with ASD, although selective cool (working memory, inhibition) and hot 
(affective decision making) EF domains presented age-related improvements, they never 
reached the performance level of the control group. Early cool working memory predicted later 
ToM in both groups but early hot delay discounting predicted later ToM only in the ASD group. 
No evidence was found for the reverse pattern (early ToM predicting later EF). These findings 
suggest that improvements in some EF aspects are evident in school age in ASD and highlight 
the crucial role both cool and hot EF play in ToM development. 
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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a multifaceted neurodevelopmental disorder that 
significantly impairs children’s verbal and nonverbal communication, social interactions, and 
behaviours (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder— DSM-5, American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Executive dysfunction has received increased attention, as 
deficits in aspects of executive function (EF) have been demonstrated consistently in ASD 
samples across the lifespan (see Hill’s review (2004) and Demetriou et al.’s (2017) meta-
analysis). EF refers to a set of future-oriented and goal-directed cognitive skills, closely 
associated to the prefrontal cortex, that are crucial for problem solving and social behaviour, 
as well as the ability to organise oneself (Best & Miller, 2010). EF problems in ASD typically 
manifest as deficits in domains such as working memory (Alloway et al., 2009; Geurts et al., 
2014; Kercood et al., 2014), inhibition (Christ et al., 2007; Happé et al., 2006a; Xiao et al., 
2012), planning (Chen et al., 2016; Kimhi et al., 2014; Verté et al., 2005) or cognitive flexibility 
(Gioia et al., 2002; South et al., 2007; Yeung et al., 2016). Although research has shown that 
impairments in specific components of EF (mostly cognitive flexibility and planning) have 
been conceptualized as being key aspects in discriminating ASD from other 
neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g. ADHD) (for a review see Craig et al., 2016), the additive 
effect comorbid ADHD has been found to have on EF deficits such as working memory 
(Andersen et al., 2013; Yerys et al., 2009) and inhibition (Sinzig et al., 2008) in ASD, should 
not be overlooked either. 
EF development is generally considered to influence the development of children’s social 
cognition (Devine et al., 2016) and is intimately tied to Theory of Mind (ToM), another 
cognitive domain known to develop atypically in ASD (Lantz, 2002). ToM is the ability to 
infer mental/ emotional states in order to predict and explain behaviour (Goldman, 2012). ToM 
is a multifaceted cognitive skill that develops gradually; its development commences in infancy 
and continues to improve throughout middle childhood and adolescence. The understanding of 
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false belief (understanding that one’s belief/ representation about the world can contrast with 
reality), which is a critical aspect of ToM, measured by first-order false belief tasks, typically 
emerges at the age of 3-4 years (Schug et al., 2016). As children grow up, they present age-
related performance gains and become capable of solving more complex, high-order ToM tasks 
(e.g. emotion understanding) across middle and later childhood (Devine & Hughes, 
2013; Dumontheil et al., 2010). Evidence from ASD suggests that some children with ASD fail 
to fully develop the prerequisites of ToM and that the ToM trajectory could follow either a 
delayed (Steele et al., 2003) or deviant (Peterson et al., 2005; Serra et al., 2002) pathway in 
ASD. 
Evidence from both typical development and ASD has consistently shown that EF is strongly 
associated to ToM across childhood (Bock et al., 2015; Carlson et al., 2013; Im-Bolter et al., 
2016). Several developmental psychologists have argued that there is in fact a more 
fundamental link between EF and ToM with functioning in one domain being a necessity for 
the emergence of the other. Perner (1998) and Perner & Lang (1999) proposed that the 
acquisition of ToM is a prerequisite of children’s ability to control their behaviour (EF) while 
alternatively, Russell (1996) suggested that the ability to control one’s actions (EF) must be 
attained first as it then crucially influences the development of ToM. Several longitudinal 
studies on the EF-ToM relationship in early childhood in typical development indicated that 
children’s performance on EF measures predicted later performance on ToM false belief tasks 
(independent of age, verbal ability, and earlier ToM scores) but not vice versa (Carlson et al., 
2004; Flynn, 2007; Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). These findings highlight that EF is 
a prerequisite for the development of ToM in early life as it scaffolds the emergence of ToM 
mechanisms (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2009; Sabbagh et al., 2006).  However, as this 
theoretical position does not account for potential EF-ToM associations beyond the fifth year, 
less is known about the extension of this developmental relationship in school aged children 
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with and without ASD. Relevant longitudinal research in school age is very limited (e.g. Austin 
et al., 2014) and has demonstrated weak evidence for the account that early ToM predicts later 
EF, but stronger support of the early EF influencing later ToM in school age. This could suggest 
that EF might play a substantial role in children’s developmental outcomes, particularly in 
relation to social cognition.  
The developmental nature of the EF-ToM relationship in ASD has been vastly theoretically 
debated due to this coexistence of deficits in both domains. Building on the initial propositions 
regarding the executive dysfunction influencing autism symptomatology (Pennington & 
Ozonoff, 1996; Russell, 1997), there is growing evidence showing that the ASD functional/ 
social outcomes, such as ToM, may be due to differences in emerging EF abilities (Demetriou 
et al., 2017;  Leung et al., 2016; Pellicano 2012; Russo et al., 2007). Performance on measures 
of EF and ToM (mainly false belief understanding tasks) have indeed been found to be 
correlated in ASD (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Kimhi et al., 2014; Kouklari et al., 2017; Pellicano, 
2007). Evidence regarding the link between EF and ToM in ASD mainly derives from the 
preschool period and full consideration of this developmental issue has not yet been possible 
due to the limited number of studies analysing this issue within a longitudinal design. Pellicano 
(2010) in a longitudinal study of two time points with children aged 4-7 years, (followed after 
3 years), indicated that cool EF abilities (planning, cognitive flexibility, and inhibition) at the 
first time point were a significant predictor of the changes in children’s ToM skills at the second 
time point (over and above the variance of age, verbal, and non-verbal ability) in ASD. 
Moreover, Tager-Flusberg and Joseph (2005) found that children’s (5-14 years) performance 
on early EF tasks predicted later ToM abilities after 1 year independent of initial ToM scores 
and verbal ability. These studies show that in ASD, as in typical development, EF skills play a 
critical role in shaping the development of ToM. The important contribution of EF in typical 
development, together with these promising findings from studies in ASD provide good reason 
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to suspect that the development of EF might critically influence children’s developmental 
trajectories of sociocognitive profiles, particularly ToM skills (with poor EF being a risk factor 
for poor developmental outcomes) in ASD.  
It should be noted that the determination of the precise nature of the EF developmental pathway 
and its influence on ToM in ASD first requires research to shed more light on the actual nature 
of EF itself (Pellicano, 2012). EF is by nature a complex construct to characterise, as most 
attempts to determine its nature reflect that “EF is by no means a unitary concept” (Elliott, 
2003). EF has traditionally been viewed through a purely cognitive lens. However, the 
theoretical distinction between cool and hot EF aspects, suggested by Zelazo and Müller 
(2002), could aid in better understanding the effect of EF development on ToM and social 
cognition in general. According to this distinction, cool EF includes processes evoked in 
motivationally neutral, non-affective situations such as inhibition, working memory, and 
planning (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012) that are usually tapped by decontextualised EF tasks, such 
as Go/No-Go, Tower of London, Digit Span tasks  (Anderson et al., 2008). In contrast to cool 
EF, hot EF are elicited under motivationally significant, affective conditions such as delay 
discounting (the tendency to choose more immediate, smaller rewards) and affective decision 
making (mental processing occurring on the selection of one or more possible options under 
risk where one employs both rational and emotional processes). Hot EF is therefore mainly 
measured by tasks with meaningful rewards and losses for the individual (i.e. the Gambling 
task and/or Delay discounting tasks).  
EF emerges early in life, evidences critical changes in school age and matures by adolescence 
(Best & Miller, 2010). EF development has been mainly assessed by tasks assessing cool EF 
despite recent evidence supporting separate domains of cool and hot EF (Kim et al., 2014; 
Willoughby et al., 2011). Generally little is known  about the developmental course of “hot”-
affective EF processes and whether cool and hot EF present similar developmental changes. 
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Hot EF is suggested as presenting rapid developments in the early years of life in typical 
development followed by age-related improvements across middle childhood and adolescence 
(Prencipe et al., 2011; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). Only a few cross-sectional studies to date have 
investigated the development of hot EF (in conjunction with cool EF) mainly in typical 
development and have yielded mixed results. No significant differences have been found in the 
development of hot and cool EF in the preschool period (3-5 years) with both domains being 
correlated and exhibiting performance gains after the third year of life (Hongwanishkul et al., 
2005). Further evidence from middle childhood and adolescence (Hooper et al., 2004; Prencipe 
et al., 2011) suggested that the weakly correlated hot and cool EF develop independently, and 
hot EF is likely to follow a differentiated developmental trajectory beyond the 5 years of age. 
The potential differences in the developmental trends of cool and hot EF is an open topic of 
debate, and such examination in ASD could make it plausible for separate EF domains to be 
found specifically affected or have specific developmental relations to other outcomes such as 
ToM. 
 
The limited number of longitudinal EF studies in ASD have focused only on cool aspects to 
date and due to mixed results it is not clear whether the development of EF in ASD follows the 
same pathway as that of typical development. Early studies (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & 
Rogers, 1999; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994) indicated a lack of age-related improvements and 
poorer performance for children and adolescents with ASD relative to matched controls in 
measures of selective cool EF (i.e. planning and cognitive flexibility) across time. More 
recently though, Pellicano (2010), found that EF planning of pre-schoolers with ASD (mean 
age 5.5 years) improved significantly over a 3 year period, surprisingly at an even faster rate 
than the controls. Identifying the developmental pathways of both cool and hot EF could 
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provide a solid ground to overcome the limitations of current theories of EF development and 
lead to a better understanding of the heterogeneity in neurocognitive impairments in ASD.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that research into the ToM-EF association in school aged participants 
has mainly employed cool EF tasks, despite hot EF and ToM considered as being mediated by 
the same medial regions of the prefrontal cortex (Chan et al., 2008; McDonald, 2013; Sabbagh 
et al., 2009). For instance, social interactions that involve ToM abilities may require the control 
of behaviour or thought under emotionally significant situations (hot EF) (Zelazo & Müller, 
2002). Thus, hot EF could be more central to the emergence of ToM. There is no study in ASD 
to date either that has investigated whether hot EF influences ToM across time and how they 
may interact within the cognitive profile of school aged children with ASD. The present study 
may hopefully enhance our understanding of the higher-order cognitive deficits that underpin 
social interaction problems in ASD. 
 
Current Objectives 
Research on the development of hot EF both in typical development and in ASD lags behind 
that of cool EF and the understanding of the potential link between hot EF and ToM is quite 
limited. Longitudinal studies investigating the links between EF and ToM in the school age 
period (> 5 years) are very limited (Devine & Hughes, 2014). Extending the developmental 
EF-ToM research in school aged children is critical in order to examine whether developmental 
patterns found in early life persist across the course of children’s development (McAlister & 
Peterson, 2013). Moreover, based on the evidence presented above (Hooper et al., 2004; 
Prencipe et al., 2011), distinct EF domains (hot and cool) are expected to follow different 
developmental trends and become more specialised across middle childhood and adolescence. 
The present study therefore attempted to address these gaps in the literature. 
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The first aim of this study was to compare the developmental changes in cool and hot EF and 
ToM abilities between school aged children with and without ASD after a one year interval. 
Taken together, previous studies show there is no clear developmental framework of cool EF 
in ASD; with some studies reporting age-related improvements (Pellicano, 2010) and others 
not (Griffith et al., 1999; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994). Moreover, no research to date has 
investigated the development of hot EF in ASD. Due to these mixed findings and the minimal 
longitudinal evidence regarding the development of hot EF in ASD, the present study was 
exploratory and specific predictions could not be made. We sought to determine whether there 
are similarities or deviance/delay relative to controls in the hot and cool EF developmental 
pathways followed in ASD. 
The second aim was to shed more light on the longitudinal association between cool and hot 
EF and ToM in school aged children with and without ASD. Based on previous research, 
specific predictions can be made only about the cool EF-ToM link, due to the current lack of 
relevant longitudinal hot EF research. Specifically, there is stronger evidence for the cool EF 
to predict the emergence of ToM rather than the opposite in early childhood and the preschool 
period in typical development (Marcovitch et al., 2014) and ASD (Pellicano, 2010, 2012).  We 
hypothesised that early cool EF would predict later ToM also in school aged children with and 
without ASD. Taking into consideration the theoretical notion that ToM may be more strongly 
related to hot EF than cool EF (Zelazo et al., 2005) we attempted to examine whether later 
ToM performance could be also predicted by early hot EF performance after controlling for 
potential covariates and cool EF and whether the association of hot EF variables to ToM was 
stronger in either controls or ASD, by including hot EF X ASD diagnosis interaction terms. 
 
 
10 
EF-TOM LINKS IN ASD 
Method 
Participants 
Forty five (45) children with a clinical diagnosis of ASD (38 males) (M=9.07 years, SD=1.42) 
and thirty seven (37) controls (M=9.03 years, SD=1.17) (35 males) aged 7-11 years old were 
recruited to participate in the present study. They were followed up one year after the initial 
assessment (two time points). At the second time point all 82 children were followed up (0% 
attrition). All ASD participants were high functioning (IQ >70), held a clinical diagnosis by a 
qualified clinician using DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) or DSM-V 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) criteria and qualified for a “broad ASD” on the 
Autism Diagnostic Interview/Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI/ADI-R; Le Couteur 
et al., 1989; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) and/or the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) , in accordance to National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2011) guidelines. They were also in receipt of a Statement of 
Special Educational Needs (SEN), a legal document that details the child’s needs and services 
that the local authority has a duty to provide, which specified ASD as their primary need. All 
clinical records were inspected and any individual lacking detailed information about the 
official source of diagnosis was excluded from the study. Additional exclusion criteria for the 
ASD group included the presence of a diagnosed psychiatric illness, comorbid conditions (i.e. 
ADHD, seizures or colour blindness) and Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ) below 70 as 
determined by the abbreviated version of the Wechsler Intelligence scales (two subtests: 
vocabulary and matrix reasoning; Wechsler, 1999). Typically developing participants were 
required to have no diagnosis, and no family history of ASD or other mental health disorders, 
dyslexia or learning disability. Participants were matched for chronological age (t (80) = -.13, 
p = .89) and FSIQ (t (80) = 1.73, p = .09). Most of the participants were white from mixed 
socioeconomic backgrounds and spoke English as their first language. Specific data on the 
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socioeconomic status or educational attainment levels of their parents were not recorded. 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained and all participants’ parents/carers gave written 
informed consent (consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki) in compliance to the University 
Research Ethics Committee. Table 1 shows descriptive characteristics (means and standard 
deviations) of participants of both groups.  
[Table 1 should be placed here] 
 
Measures 
Cool Executive Function 
Inhibition. The ‘R’ and ‘P’ version of the Go/No-Go paradigm (Mueller & Piper, 2014) was 
used in the present study to assess participants’ response inhibition. An image of either the 
letter P or letter R appeared in the centre of the screen (for 1500 milliseconds) on a black 
background. Participants were then instructed to press the button only when the letter P was 
shown (Go trials) and to avoid pressing it for the letter R (No-Go trials). On the second block 
of trials, the pattern was reversed and the participants were asked to press the button when the 
letter R appeared (Go trials) and to avoid pressing it when P was presented (No-Go trials) this 
time. There was no feedback provided after a correct or incorrect response. Before each block, 
participants first completed 10 practice trials followed by the actual 320 test trials. In order to 
measure participants’ response inhibition, the proportion of incorrect No-Go trials was 
recorded. Lower scores indicated better performance. 
Planning. Participants’ planning ability was measured by the Tower of London (ToL) task 
(Shallice, 1982). As a practice, participants were presented with three 3-move problems, 
followed by the 12 actual trials of the original problem set (two 2-move tasks; two 3-move 
tasks; four 4-move tasks; and four 5-move tasks). Following the procedure of Monks et al. 
12 
EF-TOM LINKS IN ASD 
(2005) and Poland et al. (2015), successful performance required participants to solve each 
problem moving only one bead each time and in the number of moves required; participants 
were given two minutes to complete each problem. The task was stopped when the participant 
completed all problems or failed two consecutively. In terms of the scoring, we measured the 
number of problems each participant completed successfully. One point was given to 
participants if they completed the problem successfully and 0 points if they failed to complete 
the problem. Scores ranged from 0 to 12. 
Working Memory. The digit span forward and backwards subtests from the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children-3rd edition were employed to measure participants’ verbal 
working memory (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991). Participants were asked to recall the sequence 
presented by the researcher (at a rate of one number per second) in the exact same order. In the 
backwards digit recall task, the series of numbers should be repeated in reverse order. If 
participants responded successfully to all trials (4) within a block, the researcher proceeded to 
the next block. Each block included 2 trials at each span length. In terms of scoring, participants 
were awarded 1 point for each correct trial and the task was terminated when the participant 
failed both trials at any given span length. The sum of the points awarded for both the forward 
and backward subtest created a working memory score which was then converted into a 
standardised score.  
 
Hot Executive Function 
Affective Decision Making. A modified computerised version of the IOWA gambling task 
(IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) was employed to measure participants’ affective decision making. 
Participants were presented with four decks of cards (A, B, C, and D) and were told they should 
select a card from any of the four decks each time. Decks A and B were equivalent in terms of 
overall net loss, whereas decks C and D were equivalent in terms of overall net winning. For 
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each card selection, the wins and losses were set in a way that in every block of 20 cards from 
Decks A or B there was a potential total gain of £1,000, interrupted by potential losses up to 
£1,250. Losses were less frequent but of a larger magnitude in deck B whereas in Deck A losses 
were more frequent but in smaller amounts. For Decks C and D, the wins for each block were 
£500 totally while the potential net losses £250. In Deck D losses were less frequent and of 
higher magnitude relative to those in Deck C. Thus, Decks A and B were equally 
“disadvantageous” relative to Decks C and D that were equally “advantageous”. We measured 
whether participants made mainly more advantageous or disadvantageous decisions. Based on 
the approach used by Verdejo-Garcia et al. (2006), scores were calculated by subtracting the 
number of disadvantageous choices (decks A and B) from the number of advantageous choices 
(decks C and D) divided then by the total number of trials.  
 
Delay Discounting. In line with previous research studying hot EF (Hongwanishkul et al., 
2005; Prencipe et al., 2011), the Delay Discounting task was used in the present study in a 
computerised version to measure the extent to which participants do discount future rewards 
(Richards et al., 1999). This task originally included the forced-choice between different 
amounts of money after different delays or with different chances. However, as the task was 
being given to school aged participants it was decided to modify it and completely remove the 
probability questions. Participants were told that they had to choose (hypothetically) between 
an immediate amount of money or £10 available after a delay. The test consisted of about 70 
such questions (i.e. (a) Would you rather have £10 for sure in 30 days or (b) £2 for sure right 
now?). The amount of immediate money was adjusted across trials until an amount was reached 
that was determined by previous choices as being equivalent to a delayed £10 reward; until the 
participant was indifferent between the two choices (random adjusting procedure; for more 
details see Richards et al., 1999). For every participant, this indifference point (the amount of 
immediate money judged to be equivalent to £10) signified the subjective value of the delayed 
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large reward (Richards et al., 1999). Delay discounting was determined by five delays (0, 10, 
30, 180, and 365 days later). In terms of scoring we followed the procedure described in 
Myerson et al. (2001), where the indifference points were used to estimate delay discounting. 
Thus, indifference points were established within participants and were plotted against time 
(delay). Indifference points and delays were normalised, by expressing indifference points as 
proportions of the amount of the maximum delayed reward (£10) and the delays as proportions 
of the maximum delay (365 days). These normalised values were used as the x (delay) and y 
(indifference points) axes in order to plot the discounting function. Four separate trapezoids 
were then created by drawing vertical lines from each data point on the x axis. The formula 
(x2-x1) ・ [(y1 + y2) ⁄ 2] was used to calculate the area of each trapezoid. The areas under these 
discounting curves (AUC) were calculated by summing the resulting trapezoids.  
 
Theory of Mind 
 
False belief. In order to measure participants’ false belief understanding, the Sandbox Task 
(Begeer et al., 2012) was used. Participants were told that this task was about a father and a 
daughter (Sanne) planting flower bulbs in a sandbox. The researcher showed the participants 
the picture of a sandbox and told them the father decided to bury the flower bulb at the location 
of the cross. When the father went away to bring a watering can, Sanne decided to move the 
flower bulb and bury it in a different location. Before asking the false belief question, the 
researcher asked whether participants had a good look at the pictures and remembered where 
each character (Sanne and her dad) placed the flowerbulb, in order to ensure that they have the 
requisite attentional or memory capacities necessary to demonstrate their theory of mind 
knowledge (control question). The researcher then asked participants one false belief question: 
“When Sanne’s dad comes back with the watering can where will he give water to the flower 
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bulb? You have to draw a cross”. In terms of scoring, the difference between the original hiding 
location of the flower bulb (0 mm) and the location where participants indicated dad would 
look for it was measured (in millimetres). If participants indicated a location towards the 
direction of Sanne’s hiding location of the flower bulb (63 mm) they received a positive bias 
score. If participants indicated a location in the opposite direction of the flower bulb, to the 
right of the original hiding location, they received a negative bias score. Lower scores indicated 
better performance. This paradigm was employed because, as the object is buried and reburied 
in the sandbox, a continuum is created between locations in contrast to the categorical approach 
of the classic false belief task that has been found to sometimes omit the subtle variance in false 
belief reasoning at different ages (Bernstein et al., 2011). 
 
Emotion recognition 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (children’s version; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was used 
to assess mental state/ emotion recognition.  This task was chosen as it is a widely used ToM 
test that measures the ability to decode the feelings and thoughts of others from the eyes. The 
test can also be considered an emotion recognition test (Vellante et al., 2013). It consists of 
photographs of the eye regions of 28 faces. Participants were asked to make a choice between 
four words presented at the bottom of the page on which each picture appeared, choosing the 
one that best described what the person of the photograph was feeling or thinking. Successful 
performance required participants to select the correct mental and emotional state. Participants 
were asked to choose one of the terms even if they said that any term was quite right, thus 
conforming to a forced-choice procedure. One point was given to each correctly reported 
response.  
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Procedure 
The current study followed a longitudinal design with two time points, approximately one year 
apart. At both assessment points children undertook the tests individually across two sessions 
(each lasted 40 minutes) with a female researcher in a quiet space at their school. All tasks 
were addressed in a fixed order across the two assessment sessions: session 1: IQ test, Sandbox 
task, Digit Span, ToL, and Eyes Test; session 2: Go/No-Go, IGT, delay discounting test.  
 
Results 
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS-23®. All variables were checked for normality 
and homogeneity assumptions of parametric tests.  No extreme outliers were found. Analyses 
was conducted at two levels. The developmental changes in cool & hot EF and ToM of children 
with ASD relative to neurotypical controls across the 12 months were firstly examined. 
Secondly the predictive relation between hot & cool EF and ToM across the two time points 
was investigated. No violations of multivariate assumptions for these variables were found. All 
tests were two-tailed and statistical significance was set at p < .05. 
Comparison of the developmental changes in EF and ToM between the two groups 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for hot & cool EF and ToM at each time point. The 
developmental changes in children’s EF and ToM abilities across time points were examined 
by carrying out a mixed ANOVA. Time was set as the within-subject factor (T1, T2) and Group 
as the between-subject factor (ASD or control). Post hoc tests were not performed for Group 
because there were fewer than three groups. Within group comparisons were assessed by paired 
sample t-tests. [Table 2 should be placed here] 
Working memory (digit span). Significant main effects of time F [(1, 80) = 50.6, p = .001, 
ŋp2 = .39] and group [F (1, 80) = 13.52, p < .001, ŋp2 = .15] were found. The interaction between 
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time and group was also significant, [F (1, 80) = 11.73, p = .001, ŋp2 = .13]. Figure 1 presents 
mean working memory score from T1 to T2 for each group. Planned comparisons demonstrated 
that the ASD group showed poorer performance in working memory than neurotypicals both 
at Time 1, F (1, 80) = 17.09, p < .001, ŋp2 = .18, and at Time 2, F (1, 80) = 6.24, p = .02, ŋp2 = 
.07. Further analyses showed that children’s performance improved significantly over time in 
both groups; ASD: t (45) = -7.96, p < .001; controls: t (37) = -2.45, p = .019. The significant 
interaction lays in the pattern of improvements over time. While both groups demonstrated 
developmental changes after 12 months, improvements for the ASD group were steeper (see 
figure 1). The ASD group demonstrated a poorer performance on digit span scores throughout 
this developmental period.  
 
Planning (Tower of London). The main effect of time [F (1, 80) = 86.65, p < .001, ŋp2 = .52], 
was found significant. Neither the main effect of group, [F (1, 80) = 1.58, p = .21, ŋp2 = .2], nor 
the interaction between time and group, [F (1, 80) = 1.67, p = .2, ŋp2 = .02], were found 
significant. Figure 1 presents mean planning score from T1 to T2 for each group. Planned 
comparisons demonstrated that the ASD group showed equal performance in planning to 
neurotypicals both at Time 1, F (1, 80) = .21, p = .65, ŋp2 = .003, and at Time 2, F (1, 80) = 
3.62, p = .061, ŋp2 = .043. Further analyses showed that children’s performance improved 
significantly over time in both groups; ASD: t (45) = -7.10, p < .001; controls: t (37) = -6.14, 
p < .001. Figure 1 reveals the similar developmental improvements after 12 months. 
Inhibition (go/no-go). The main effect of time on inhibition, [F (1, 80) = 14.61, p <.001, ŋp2 
= .15], and group [F (1, 80) = 9.68, p = .003, ŋp2 = .11], were found significant. No significant 
interaction between time and group, [F (1, 80) = 2.48, p = .12, ŋp2 = .03] was found. Figure 1 
presents mean inhibition score from T1 to T2 for each group. Planned comparisons 
demonstrated that the ASD group showed poorer performance in inhibition than neurotypicals 
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both at Time 1, F (1, 80) = 7.32, p = .008, ŋp2 = .08, and at Time 2, F (1, 80) = 12.39, p = .001, 
ŋp2 = .13. Further analyses showed that children’s performance improved significantly over 
time in both groups; ASD: t (45) = 4.3, p < .001; controls: t (37) = 2.52, p = .015;  Both groups 
demonstrated developmental performance gains after 12 months but the ASD group 
demonstrated a poorer performance on the Go/No-Go task throughout this developmental 
period.  
[Put Figure 1 here] 
Affective decision making (IOWA). The main effect of time [F (1, 80) = 17.33, p < .001, ŋp2 
= .18] and group [F (1, 80) = 4.76, p = .03, ŋp2 = .06] were found to be significant. The 
interaction between time and group, [F (1, 80) = .46, p = .49, ŋp2 = .01] was not significant. 
Figure 2 presents mean affective decision making from T1 to T2 for each group. Planned 
comparisons demonstrated that the ASD group showed poorer performance in affective 
decision making than neurotypicals both at Time 1, F (1, 80) = 4.31, p = .041, ŋp2 = .05, and at 
Time 2, F (1, 80) = 4.03, p = .048, ŋp2 = .05. Further analyses showed that children’s 
performance improved significantly over time in both groups; ASD: t (45) = -2.91, p = .006; 
controls: t (37) = -4.03, p = .001. Figure 2 shows that both groups demonstrated developmental 
performance improvements after 12 months, but with ASD children showing a poorer 
performance throughout this developmental period.  
Delay Discounting (delay discounting task). The effect of time [F (1, 80) = .09, p = .76, ŋp2 
= .001], group [F (1, 80) = 3.34, p = .071, ŋp2 = .04], and the interaction between time and 
group, [F (1, 80) = 1.91, p = .17, ŋp2 = .02], were not found significant. Figure 2 presents mean 
delay discounting score from T1 to T2 for each group. Planned comparisons demonstrated that 
the two groups showed equal performance in delay discounting both at Time 1, F (1, 80) = 
5.15, p = .06, ŋp2 = .06, and at Time 2, F (1, 80) = .46, p = .49, ŋp2 = .006. Further analyses 
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showed that children’s performance did not improve significantly over time in either group; 
ASD: t (45) = 1.41, p = .17; controls: t (37) = -.65, p = .52. Neither group presented 
developmental changes after 12 months. 
[Put Figure 2 here] 
False belief (Sandbox). The main effect of time [F (1, 80) = 4.29, p = .04, ŋp2 = .05] was found 
significant. The effect of group [F (1, 80) = 2.12, p = .15, ŋp2 = .03] was not significant while 
interaction between time and group, [F (1, 80) = 8.54, p = .005, ŋp2 = .09] was found significant. 
Figure 3 presents mean false belief score from T1 to T2 for each group. Planned comparisons 
demonstrated that the ASD group showed poorer performance in false belief than neurotypicals 
only at Time 1, F (1, 80) = 6.18, p = .015, ŋp2 = .07, but equal scores at Time 2, F (1, 80) = .06, 
p = .8, ŋp2 = .001. Further analyses showed that children’s performance improved significantly 
over time only in the ASD group; ASD: t (45) = 3.32, p = .002; controls: t (37) = -.69, p = .49.  
Mental state/ emotion recognition (Reading the Mind in the Eyes). The main effects of time 
[F (1, 80) = 92.04, p < .001, ŋp2 = .54], group [F (1, 80) = 12.13, p = .001, ŋp2 = .13], and the 
interaction between time and group, [F (1, 80) = 4.84, p = .03, ŋp2 = .06] were all found 
significant. Figure 3 presents mean mental state/ emotion recognition score from T1 to T2 for 
each group. Planned comparisons demonstrated that the ASD group showed poorer 
performance in mental state/ emotion recognition than neurotypicals both at Time 1, F (1, 80) 
= 16.43, p < .001, ŋp2 = .17, and at Time 2, F (1, 80) = 5.52, p = .021, ŋp2 = .07. Further analyses 
showed that children’s performance improved significantly over time in both groups; ASD: t 
(45) = -8.62, p < .001; controls: t (37) = -5.11, p < .001. Figure 3 shows that both groups 
demonstrated an improved performance on mental state/emotion recognition after 12 months, 
but the ASD group showed a steeper developmental change (source of interaction). The ASD 
group’s poorer performance insisted throughout this developmental period. [Put Figure 3 here] 
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Longitudinal relations between EF and ToM in children with and without ASD 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted to investigate the relation between hot & cool EF and 
ToM across the two time points (see table 3) in children with and without ASD. Table 3 shows 
that cool EF (digit span, ToL, Go-No Go scores) and both ToM tasks were significantly 
correlated at both time points. In terms of hot EF, only delay discounting was significantly 
related to ToM Eyes Test whereas performance on IOWA (affective decision making) was not 
significantly related to ToM at any of the time points. [put table 3 here] 
Following the correlational analysis, the predictive association between EF and ToM in 
children with and without ASD was examined by running two series of hierarchical regression 
models. The first series of regressions investigated whether early EF predicted later ToM (at 
T2). Block 1 of predictors included ASD diagnosis, concurrent age, concurrent Full Scale 
Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ) and early ToM (control variables). Block 2 of predictors 
introduced the individual cool EF skills in order to examine the predictive role of EF on ToM 
over and above control variables. Block 3 included the hot EF (only delay discounting; IOWA 
scores were not included in the regression models as they did not correlate with any ToM task 
at either time point) in order to assess whether hot EF can predict ToM over and above control 
variables and cool EF. Finally Block 4 of predictors included the  hot delay discounting X ASD 
diagnosis interaction term, computed from the cross-product of effect-coded ASD (-1=ASD, 
+1=Control) and the centred hot delay discounting scores (Aiken & West, 1991), in order to 
examine whether the association of hot EF to ToM was stronger in either controls or ASD. The 
second series of regressions investigated whether early ToM predicts later EF (at T2), after 
controlling for concurrent age and FSIQ, and early EF. 
Due to the large number of predictors (n=13) and the relatively small sample size (see appendix 
for full results of regression analysis and reports of collinearity diagnostics; VIFs and Tolerance 
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values), it was decided to set the cut off for significance at p < .01 rather than p < .05, for the 
following regressions, to counteract the possibility of Type I error (Robinson et al., 2016). 
Although this threshold is not as stringent as a standard Bonferroni correction, the latter has 
been widely criticized for being problematically conservative, particularly for exploratory 
research such as the following regression analysis (Perneger, 1998). Thus we assumed that p < 
.01 was satisfactory for this analysis; stringent but not overly so.  
EF predicting later ToM mental state/ emotion recognition (EyesTest at T2): 
The first block of predictors (ASD diagnosis, concurrent age & FSIQ, and early Eyes Test 
scores (T1) contributed significantly to the variance of the later Eyes Test scores, F (4, 77) = 
22.11, p < .001, explaining 53.5% of the variance. Neither for cool EF entered in block 2 [F 
(5, 72) = 0.97, p =.44] nor hot EF in block 3 [F (2, 70) = .66, p = .52], significant additional 
variance was explained. Finally for the Hot delay discounting X ASD interaction terms entered 
in block 4, the total variance explained rose to 66.2% [F (2, 68) = 9.07, p < .001]. Later ToM 
Eyes Test scores (T2) were significantly predicted by the early (T1) (p = .002) and later (T2) 
(p = .002) hot delay discounting X ASD diagnosis interactions terms. Thus, early and later 
delay discounting predicted later ToM mental state/ emotion recognition only in school aged 
children with ASD.  
EF predicting later ToM false belief (Sandbox scores at T2)  
The first block of predictors (ASD diagnosis, concurrent age & FSIQ, and early false belief 
scores (T1) contributed significantly to the variance of the ToM false belief ability, F (4, 77) = 
6.52, p < .001, explaining 25.3% of the variance. For cool EF entered in block 2 the total 
variance explained rose to 39.8%, representing a significant increase of 14.5% [F (5, 72) = 
3.48, p =.007] additional variance explained. Neither for hot EF entered in block 3 [F (2, 70) 
= 0.31, p =.74] nor for the hot delay discounting X ASD interaction entered in block 4, [F (2, 
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68) = 2.07, p =.13] significant additional variance was explained. Later ToM false belief scores 
(T2) were significantly predicted by early working memory (Digit span T1) (p = .0004) and 
later working memory (Digit span T2) (p = .0002) overall in school aged children with and 
without ASD.  
Early ToM predicting later hot and cool EF skills 
None of the regression models with early ToM skills predicting each one of the individual later 
hot and cool EF skills were significant. Early ToM skills did not predict later EF in school aged 
children with and without ASD. 
 
Discussion 
The present study examined the developmental changes of cool and hot EF and their 
associations to ToM across one year in school aged children with and without ASD. This 
longitudinal analysis demonstrated that for children with ASD, selective aspects of EF 
(working memory, inhibition, and affective decision making) presented significant age-related 
gains after one year but their impairments, present from the initial assessment, remained 
throughout development without reaching the levels of neurotypicals. For “cool” planning, 
ASD participants showed equal performance and the same developmental gains relative to 
controls while for “hot” delay discounting there were no deficits or developmental changes 
found in ASD or typical development. With regards to ToM abilities, the mental state/ emotion 
recognition presented age-related improvements but demonstrated a pattern deviant to controls 
as children’s deficits remained present across time in ASD. For false belief, our results 
suggested it followed a delayed development in ASD. Second, results of the longitudinal 
association between cool and hot EF and ToM in school aged children with and without ASD 
revealed that selective early aspects of EF (working memory, and delay discounting) predicted 
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later ToM abilities which supports the well documented theoretical account of early EF 
predicting later ToM. No evidence was found to support the argument that ToM abilities predict 
later EF. Cool EF working memory predicted later ToM false belief overall in children with 
and without ASD, while hot delay discounting predicted later ToM mental state/ emotion 
recognition over and above cool EF and control variables only in the ASD participants. This is 
the first study to date to investigate the developmental changes of both cool and hot EF across 
time and report that early hot delay discounting predicts later ToM above and beyond cool EF 
in school age in ASD. These findings highlight the multidimensional nature of EF and how its 
influence on other developmental landmarks such as ToM may increase our understanding of 
the higher-order cognitive deficits that underpin social interaction problems in ASD. 
 
Development of EF and ToM across time in school age 
Our results demonstrated that children with ASD showed age-related improvements in all cool 
EF aspects suggesting that during school age specific aspects of EF (working memory, 
inhibition, planning) present developmental gains in ASD. These results support previous 
evidence of performance gains in EF during childhood both in typical development (Carlson 
et al., 2013; Gur et al., 2012) and in ASD (Pellicano, 2010). These findings contradict two of 
the three previous longitudinal EF studies in ASD that reported no developmental 
improvements in EF, either in young children (Griffith et al., 1999) or adolescents (Ozonoff & 
McEvoy, 1994). Both of these studies indicated very few EF changes across time and suggested 
that probably there is a ceiling on the development of such cognitive abilities in ASD. In line 
with the third longitudinal EF study though (Pellicano, 2010), our findings paint a more 
positive picture of children’s with ASD EF developmental trends, indicating perhaps the 
likelihood of a window of plasticity in ASD as well. Notably, the contradicting studies (Griffith 
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et al., 1999; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994) included ASD participants much less able than in our 
study that could account for their lack of significant developmental changes. However, it 
should be noted that despite the reported developmental changes in cool working memory and 
inhibition, children with ASD presented impairments in these aspects relative to matched 
neurotypicals which remained present across development and never reached the performance 
level of the control group. This evidence in a way supports Happé et al.’s (2006b) proposition 
that there may be a particular profile of “coexisting cognitive atypicalities” in ASD that pertain 
across development. One could argue that this could suggest that children with ASD might 
eventually reach a performance ceiling in some EF aspects as Ozonoff and McEvoy (1994) 
implied in their study. Our data failed to provide more evidence about this issue as the present 
longitudinal design included only two time points and the sample did not include adolescents 
or young adults which could shed more light on the maturity peaks of EF in ASD (if they ever 
develop up to the same level as controls). The present data indicate thus that despite the 
significant age-related improvements in working memory and inhibition, the performance of 
the ASD group never reached that of controls which in a way implies deviant development 
across the age range of the present sample. The suggested deviant development should not 
allow though for the present data to be overlooked. More specifically, it is worth considering 
the present data from the maturation processes perspective of Luna et al. (2007) that proposed 
that if deficits in EF persist across development, it could imply that impairments in the 
underlying EF brain mechanisms are not related to the brain developmental/ maturation 
processes. This, in conjunction with the emerging developmental improvements we found here, 
could suggest that the developmental processes may be intact for ASD participants across this 
specific age range (middle childhood). The fact that planning ability presented an intact profile 
and similar developmental improvements to the control group (no deviance) as also shown in 
a previous study (Happé et al., 2006a) could actually add more support to this notion that, at 
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least in school age, developmental/ maturation processes of selective cool EF are intact in ASD. 
The developmental pattern of cool EF gains in school age could be explained in relation to the 
prefrontal cortex (the underlying brain region of EF) undergoing substantial maturation during 
this period (Otero & Barker, 2014).  School age is a crucial period of rapid developmental 
improvements and increased cognitive demands where children have to process and understand 
both their own sense of self and their sense of others as well as learning to interact effectively 
with the world around them (Siegel, 2013) which could justify these advances.  
School age is an important developmental period demanding not only cool EF improvements, 
but also hot EF gains, as the social contexts children are faced with involve advanced emotional 
and motivational processes. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the 
developmental changes of hot EF in ASD across time and showed that only affective decision 
making presented significant age-related gains in school aged children with ASD. Our results 
are in line with previous research (Hooper et al., 2004; Prencipe et al., 2011) that reported age-
related performance gains in affective decision making (Iowa Gambling Task) across childhood 
and adolescence as well as with developmental theories proposing that the development of hot 
EF would be protracted to the extended development of the underlying brain region that is the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, across school age (Segalowitz & Davies, 2004). As with the 
cool EF developmental framework discussed above, despite the emerging developmental 
improvements, children with ASD presented deficits in affective decision making relative to 
the control group that did not become less marked with age (deviant to control group 
development across middle childhood). The emerging developmental gains in this hot EF 
aspect, despite the persisting deficits, highlight the importance of this finding since it suggests 
that the developmental/maturation processes of the brain structures underpinning selective hot 
systems in ASD continue across school age. The cognitive maturation processes of the areas of 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex regulating affective decision making seem to progress across 
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school age in ASD. It should be noted at this point that our assumption that the persisting 
performance deficits of the ASD group (despite the developmental improvements found) 
suggest a deviant rather than a delayed pattern should be treated with caution. We have made 
sure to clarify at all relevant points in discussion above that these suggested as deviant 
developmental patterns apply only to the specific age range employed in the present study. It 
is likely that group differences may eventually lessen with further age if performance was to 
be assessed at an older age for example (late adolescence or young adulthood). 
Contrary to the significant results of cool EF and hot affective decision making, hot delay 
discounting demonstrated an intact profile (in ASD) and non-significant developmental 
changes neither in ASD nor typical development. These results contradict previous cross 
sectional evidence having indicated age-related improvements in the delay discounting task 
(Scheres et al., 2006) across childhood and adolescence. Scheres et al. (2006) employed a 
temporal and probabilistic discounting task that had a differentiated design with shorter time 
delays, smaller immediate monetary rewards as well as levels of probability for the delayed 
reward. Besides this, the monetary awards they offered were real, contrary to ours being 
hypothetical due to the impractical cost and ethical issues raised within the school contexts. 
Such measures discrepancies could have perhaps made their older participants more motivated 
to wait for the larger rewards during the task relative to the younger ones resulting in the 
reported age-related gains. As the differentiated designs of delay discounting tasks are 
multifaceted and with levels of difficulty/complexity, we could assume that our delay 
discounting task dimensions were not developmentally sensitive enough to capture subtle age-
related differences across school age in either group. Steinberg et al. (2009) in fact suggest that 
differentiated task designs do not likely follow the same developmental pathway. Besides task 
discrepancies though, the lack of significant developmental changes in hot delay discounting 
relative to the other hot aspect (affective decision making) is quite surprising and raises 
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questions about their underlying brain structures and developmental course. One should expect 
the delay discounting trajectory to progress across school age as children are in greater need of 
their impulsivity control (tapped by delay discounting) within the more demanding social and 
educational settings. As findings from early childhood (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012) and 
adolescence (Scheres et al., 2014) have both demonstrated age-related gains, it makes us 
consider the possibility that delay discounting may present a developmental pause during 
middle childhood (6/7-11) years before continuing to progression in adolescence. This 
assumption needs to be cautiously interpreted as the present design did not include a third or 
more time points across school age and adolescence that could clarify this issue. Finally, as 
several measures thought to tap hot EF have been criticized for lacking enough “heat” or not 
being ecologically valid (Welsh & Peterson 2014), one potential explanation behind the lack 
of significant developmental changes here could be the delay discounting task not being so hot 
for this specific age range. One could argue that differing quantities of imaginary money is 
quite an abstract construct that failed to enhance young children’s motivation or increase their 
sensitivity to money loss. 
Regarding the developmental course of ToM in ASD, discussion will not go in great depth as 
our main focus in the present study was its longitudinal association to EF across school age. 
ToM mental state/ emotion understanding ability and false belief understanding ability both 
made substantial progress in ASD across the 1-year period and expand relevant findings from 
longitudinal studies in preschool period (Pellicano, 2010; Steele et al., 2003) to school age as 
well. The ASD performance in mental state/ emotion recognition (Eyes task) never reached up 
the level of the control group despite the age-related gains which implies that, as with cool EF 
described above, the developmental trend of this ToM ability for this specific age range could 
be argued as deviant of the typical development one. Once again, such an assumption is not 
warranted as group differences may eventually not be significant at an older age (after middle 
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childhood). The small but significant changes however highlight that ToM gains, should they 
occur, may be present beyond preschool period in ASD. In contrast to this, false belief 
understanding (Sandbox task) in ASD presented a differentiated developmental course as 
impairments were present only at the initial assessment point. Age-related gains emerged only 
in the ASD group, with false belief performance reaching up the controls’ level at the second 
time point. This could imply that the false belief ability in ASD presents a delayed 
developmental pattern in our study. Failure to report developmental gains in the control group 
is due to ceiling effect (Sandbox task probably not sensitive enough to developmental trends 
of typical development). It seems that the ASD heterogeneity and the unique ToM profiles of 
distinct tasks cannot allow for neither the delayed nor the deviant development hypothesis to 
fully explain the ToM deﬁcits in ASD. Our data support Baron-Cohen’s (1991) proposition that 
ToM development in ASD fits a hypothesis of both deviance and delay.  
 
Longitudinal associations between hot and cool EF and ToM across time in school age 
Our results showed that EF and ToM are developmentally linked across school age. In line 
with the vast majority of previous studies (see for a review Devine & Hughes, 2014), early EF 
predicted later ToM rather than the reverse pattern (early ToM predicting later EF). Therefore 
these findings add more to the theoretical account suggesting that emerging EF in childhood is 
a potent, although not exclusive  platform for the development of ToM both in typical 
development (Flynn, 2007; Hughes, 1998) and ASD (Pellicano, 2010). The emergence account 
of ToM posits that early EF skills predict later ToM; thus children would first need to obtain 
sufficient EF skills and then understand and process ToM false beliefs or mental states (Russell, 
1996). Indeed, after controlling for concurrent age, FSIQ, and prior ToM, we found that early 
working memory predicted later ToM false belief while early delay discounting predicted later 
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ToM mental state/emotion recognition in ASD. These findings thus do not support Perner’s 
(1998) proposition that the acquisition of ToM is a prerequisite of children’s, according to 
which, longitudinal predictions from earlier EF are not expected for a ToM task.  
In line with our hypothesis and previous cross sectional and longitudinal studies that presented 
associations between cool EF and ToM in typical development and ASD (Carlson & Moses, 
2001; Pellicano, 2007; Kimhi et al., 2014), we found that later ToM false belief was predicted 
by early cool working memory. Children between 3 and 5 years of age present dramatic and 
rapid improvements in EF and ToM (Anderson, 2008) but the present findings suggest that 
developmental changes in ToM mechanisms across school age (beyond 5 years) may require 
EF to facilitate the emergence of more sophisticated ToM abilities. Advanced needs for 
cognitive executive control during school age are more than expected as children have to 
maintain and manipulate new, complex knowledge while socially interacting with their 
environments (Del Giudice, 2014). This evidence supports the working memory hypothesis 
according to which the working memory development is an important factor influencing 
children's developing understanding of false belief (Davis & Pratt, 1995) in early childhood, as 
replicated by other studies too (Gordon & Olson, 1998; Keenan et al.,  1998). It could be then 
argued that also across school age children with or without ASD need a heavier (improved) 
cognitive load on working memory towards a successful ToM development. Working memory 
and inhibition are generally considered central to the EF-false belief relation (Carlson et al., 
2002; Devine & Hughes, 2014), a notion for which we provided limited support. Contradicting 
prior studies in early childhood (Carlson et al., 2013; Carlson et al., 2004), inhibition did not 
predict later ToM false belief in school age in our study. One could thus argue that inhibition 
may be more central to the emergence of false belief at the early years of childhood (Tillman 
et al., 2015) and as ToM abilities progress across childhood, other EF may be more central to 
the development of ToM. 
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Another important finding of the present study was the significant longitudinal predictive 
association found between hot delay discounting and ToM mental state/ emotion recognition, 
over and above cool EF and control variables in ASD. Current findings corroborate to an extent 
that there may be a developmental relation of the underlying brain mechanisms of selective hot 
processes and ToM present in ASD across time. Delay discounting could be linked with the 
emergence of ToM as, in order for children with ASD to understand the mental states of others, 
“hot” motivational or emotional processes need to be evoked (Zelazo et al., 2005) across school 
age. This emerging association between two seemingly unrelated constructs suggests that the 
ability of school aged children with ASD to disengage from the present while considering more 
long-term goals/ temporal perspectives (delay discounting) may provide a platform for the 
development of one’s emotion understanding ability. Stolarski (2011) has also suggested that 
emotional functioning is linked with the development of temporal perspectives (i.e. delay 
discounting). As this longitudinal association between delay discounting and mental state/ 
emotion recognition was found only in the ASD group, it could imply there is a specificity in 
the relation between ToM and this hot executive process in ASD. However as delay discounting 
did not predict later false belief understanding (the other ToM task), this assumption has to be 
examined cautiously. The developmental association between these delay related motivational 
processes and ToM mechanisms being stronger in the ASD group needs to be tackled by future 
imaging studies investigating the structure of the underlying brain regions. For example, 
previous fMRI research in clinical population showed an association between ADHD and 
activity in the ventral striatum (brain region responsible for preference for small sooner rewards 
over large later rewards; McClure et al., 2004) during reward anticipation in delay tasks 
(Scheres et al., 2007; Ströhle et al., 2008). Relevant research could perhaps clarify if that could 
also be the case for ASD. 
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The present findings need to be interpreted cautiously in the light of limitations and be also 
corroborated with results from larger longitudinal studies with more than two time points across 
school age. First, as the present study followed the approach of the convenience sampling, the 
sample of the ASD participants was quite small (e.g. the between-groups IQ statistical 
difference of p = 0.09 indicates a medium effect size) and may not reflect the broader ASD 
population. Furthermore the participants of the present study were aged between 7-11 years 
old only. It thus remains to be examined whether these results can be generalised to younger 
children, adolescents or adults across the spectrum. The fact that we did not include a validated 
screening measure to corroborate the clinical diagnostic reports was another important 
limitation. Finally, it should be noted that clear conclusions about the longitudinal association 
between hot EF and the broader ToM mechanism cannot be drawn as early hot delay 
discounting predicted only one of the two later ToM measures addressed here. Moreover, these 
two ToM measures tap only some of the various ToM skills and cannot be considered as the 
only crucial ToM measures. Future longitudinal research thus could investigate the impact of 
hot EF to several other ToM tasks such as the strange stories (Happé, 1994), second-order ToM 
(Perner & Wimmer, 1985) or the Faux Pas test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).  
In conclusion, the present study demonstrated that for children with ASD, selective cool and 
hot EF skills, and ToM abilities presented significant developmental changes across time in 
school age. These data highlight the need to shed more light on the underlying brain structures 
as the reported impairments in EF are likely not related to the maturation processes. 
Furthermore, our data provided more to the theoretical account that cool EF influences the 
development of ToM and not vice versa in ASD and typical development, while expanding 
these longitudinal associations of ToM to hot EF as well suggesting that specific hot EF skills 
(delay discounting) also provide a platform for the emergence of ToM across school age in 
ASD. Although research into hot EF in childhood has recently received increased attention, 
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knowledge of its developmental trajectory still lags behind that of cool EF both in typical 
development and ASD, mainly due to the limited number of tasks that actually tap hot EF skills. 
Future research should direct more attention towards the development of more relevant tasks 
to measure these hot EF skills. Finally, findings of specific EF predicting later ToM contributed 
support to an emergence account (Russell, 1996, 1997) in typical development and ASD. 
Studying the developmental trends of hot and cool EF and their longitudinal associations to 
ToM may aid in gaining a greater understanding of the link between cognition and behaviour 
in typical development and of the development of higher-order cognitive impairments being a 
risk factor for poor developmental/ social outcomes in children with ASD. Our findings 
highlight the need to address both hot and cool EF in clinical practice as they could contribute 
more towards future diagnosis or intervention projects. 
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Table 1. Participants’ characteristics 
                                      
Group 
 
    
   Variable 
ASD  
(n=45) 
Control  
(n=37) 
Age (in years) 
M (SD)  
Range 
 
9.07 (1.42) 
7-11 
 
9.03 (1.17) 
7-11 
FSIQ total score 
M (SD) 
Range 
 
97.05 (12.13) 
70-127 
 
102.11 (14.3) 
76-135 
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations for variables across the time points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 T1  T2  
 Control ASD Control ASD 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Go/No-Go 36.86 20.46 47.77 16.04 34.03 17.06 46.59 15.22 
ToL 7.45 1.58 7.26 2.04 9.34 1.45 8.69 1.60 
Digit Span 9.71 2.39 7.18 3.03 10.47 2.54 9.34 1.66 
IGT .04 .21 -.05 .19 .08 .16 .02 .16 
Delay  .36 1.32 .45 .20 .38 .17 .41 .17 
Sandbox 2.76 1.04 3.93 2.81 2.95 1.51 2.85 1.97 
Eyes Test 18.20 2.81 15.33 3.47 20.25 2.82 18.6 3.43 
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Table 3. Correlations between ToM and EF tasks across the two time points. 
  False Belief 
T1 
False Belief 
T2 
Eyes test 
T1 
Eyes Test  
T2 
T1 Inhibition .09 -.05 -.37** -.18 
T1 Planning  -.27* -.14 .21* .19 
T1 WM  -.14  .10 .24* .04 
T1 IOWA  .014  -.04 .18 .10 
T1 Delay  .12  -.03 -.25* -.24* 
T2 Inhibition   .14  -.04 -.38** -.21 
T2 Planning   -.35**  -.16 .31** .24* 
T2 WM  -.16  -.18 .18 .09 
T2 IOWA  -.13  -.11 .11 .004 
T2 Delay   .12  .02 -.12 -.15 
 
            Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Mean Cool EF scores across 12 months for ASD and control groups. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean Hot EF scores across 12 months for ASD and control groups. 
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Figure 3. Mean ToM scores across 12 months for ASD and control groups. 
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Appendix 
Table A. Hierarchical regression analysis for later ToM false belief (T2) by group and EF variables. 
 
 
 
*Averaged Inhibition in block 3 represents the average score of early and later Inhibition 
variables. It was decided to include this variable because the initial regression model with both 
inhibition variables suffered from multicollinearity issues due to those variables being highly 
correlated (r= .97).  
 
 
 
 
Block 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
ΔR2 P 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 Control Variables  .25 < .001   
Concurrent Age -.053  .608 .900 1.111 
ASD diagnosis .163  .118 .906 1.103 
Concurrent IQ -.005  .962 .924 1.082 
Early False Belief (T1) .507  <. 001 .884 1.131 
2 Cool EF  .15 .007   
 Early Working Memory .576  < .001 .352 2.839 
Later  Working Memory -.595  < .001 .360 2.781 
Early Planning  -.059  .608 .632 1.583 
Later Planning .051  .666 .601 1.665 
Averaged Inhibition* -.029  .772 .866 1.154 
3 Hot EF  .005 .74   
Early Delay Discounting -.057  .577 .825 1.212 
Later Delay Discounting -.034  .732 .846 1.182 
4 Hot EF X ASD 
interactions 
 .034 .13   
ASD X Early Del. Disc. .121  .317 .579 1.728 
ASD X Later Del. Disc. -.210  .059 .691 1.447 
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Table B. Hierarchical regression analysis for later ToM mental state/ emotion recognition (T2) by 
group and EF variables. 
 
 
 
 
*Averaged Inhibition in block 3 represents the average score of early and later Inhibition 
variables. It was decided to include this variable because the initial regression model with 
both inhibition variables suffered from multicollinearity issues due to those variables being 
highly correlated (r= .97). 
Block 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
ΔR2 P 
Collinearity Statistics 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 Control Variables  .54 < .001   
Concurrent Age .150  .073 .891 1.122 
ASD diagnosis -.037  .671 .824 1.213 
Concurrent IQ .004  .962 .843 1.186 
Early Eyes Test (T1) .708  <. 001 .738 1.356 
2 Cool EF  .03 .44   
 Early Working Memory -.230  .083 .352 2.838 
Later  Working Memory .106  .416 .357 2.797 
Early Planning  .054  .579 .638 1.567 
Later Planning -.019  .850 .606 1.651 
Averaged Inhibition* .086  .326 .809 1.236 
3 Hot EF  .008 .52   
Early Delay Discounting -.083  .345 .794 1.259 
Later Delay Discounting -.027  .752 .847 1.181 
4 Hot EF X ASD 
interactions 
 .09 < .001   
ASD X Early Del. Disc. -.304  .002 .576 1.736 
ASD X Later Del. Disc. .281  .002 .677 1.477 
